Negotiated political settlements to prevent or end a full-scale civil war overwhelmingly involve power-sharing institutions (in a broad sense, including territorial power sharing), yet increasingly also incorporate transitional justice elements. Thus, it becomes more important to understand the intended and unintended effects that power-sharing settlements have, or may have, on the feasibility and viability of (transitional) justice options in the short- and long-term, and vice versa. It will also be useful to understand whether or to what extent power-sharing solutions can be crafted to leave space for transitional justice efforts.
What kind of transitional justice programmes (judicial, non-judicial, or combination thereof) within power-sharing political settlements enhance both short and long-term prospects for peace, justice, and democracy? This is a crucial question not only from a policy perspective but also from the perspective of conflict management theory. Yet, very little systematic comparative research has been carried out regarding the effect that the establishment of power-sharing institutions has on the attainability of particular kinds of justice, and thus, arguably, on the sustainability of peace and (the quality of) democracy.
This project thus proposes to examine this question empirically and analytically within a framework of a broader theory of conflict management that takes account not only of the institutional design in agreements but also of the context in which they are negotiated, implemented, and operated, and thus of less tangible (and in a sense less easily measurable) factors of (local) leadership and (international) diplomacy.
Further information about funding, the application process, including how to prepare a research proposal, can be found here:
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/government-society/departments/political-science-international-studies/courses/doctoral-research.aspx. PLEASE CONSULT THIS PAGE PRIOR TO MAKING FURTHER ENQUIRIES.
