Balancing Expressive Rights against the “Rights and Freedoms of Others” at the European Court of Human Rights

Liberal democracies in recent decades have frequently been faced with serious conflicts between the rights of individuals and groups to express their opinions or manifest their beliefs, on the one hand, and the rights and freedoms of others, in the other.

These areas have frequently been subjected to litigation before the European Court of Human Rights, applying the European Convention of Human Rights, but also before national courts and other international human rights tribunals. The “rights and freedoms of others” have been held to include not just commonly accepted human rights such as privacy, but also, amongst other things, the rights: not to be subjected to deep offence in relation to one’s beliefs; not to have one’s individual or group dignity subjected to insult; not to have the integrity of democracy undermined; not to have the secular nature of the state jeopardized; and being able to openly live together with others in society. Some of many cases in which the European Court has considered such issues include: Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom (2013), Periçek v Switzerland (2015), SAS v France (2014), Mouvement Räelien Suisse v Switzerland (2012), Delfi AS v Estonia (2015), Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria (1994) and Leyla Şahin V Turkey (2005).

This project will explore how the balance has been struck between the expressive rights of some and the “rights and freedoms of others”, with a suggested primary focus on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. There is scope for examination and analysis of, amongst other things: the theoretical underpinnings, and scope of, the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief; the existence (or not) of a “right” not to be offended; the utility and meaning of concepts such as toleration, dignity, autonomy, empathy, reciprocity, secularism, and multiculturalism, and the mechanics of the jurisprudence of the European Court including such doctrines as proportionality and the margin of appreciation.

Without being prescriptive about the precise ambit or direction of the project, we welcome proposals from those interested in examining these issues from a human rights perspective.

Entry Criteria
UK 1st Class/2:1 Bachelor’s degree (or UK equivalent according to NARIC) in Law and preferably a Masters degree in Law.