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NGCM-0066: Investigating systemic risk, moral hazard, and regulatory policies in networks of connected banks.

  • Full or part time
  • Application Deadline
    Applications accepted all year round
  • Competition Funded PhD Project (European/UK Students Only)
    Competition Funded PhD Project (European/UK Students Only)

Project Description

The global financial crisis of 2007-08 left governments facing a major dilemma; should they offer financial assistance to distressed banks in the form of a bailout, or leave them to go bankrupt and face the systemic consequences for the rest of the economy. The decisionproblem about bailout has traditionally been viewed as a trade-off between the regulators’ preference for minimising either moral hazard or contagion and there is an extensive game-theoretic literature. However, studies in this domain are typically confined to strict equilibrium analysis of settings with very few actors.

Hence, these models lack a detailed analysis of the true systemic risk within the interbank market, as they fail to capture heterogeneity in network structure and bank size. The need for a better understanding of systemic risk has led to a dramatic rise in literature analysingcontagion using percolation techniques. Recent models have introduced dynamic interbank networks and multiple contagion channels, which allow the market dynamics of a bankruptcy to be studied. However, whilst these models allow an analysis of cascading dynamics in the short term, they are not suitable for analysing the effect of bankruptcy resolution policy in the long term as they assume banks’ risk appetites to be fixed rather than adaptive, meaning that no moral hazard effect be captured in the system.

This project proposes to combine both traditional strands of the literature to develop simulation models of bank behaviour in networked settings. Building on a recent study of moral hazard effects and bailout in very abstract simplified networked banking systems it will extend the work to include: (i) more realistic game theoretical descriptions of bank behaviour, (ii) a more detailed description of contagion channels of financial distress using multi-layered network approaches, and (iii) considerations of network dynamics as banks rearrange their risk exposures during crises.

If you wish to discuss any details of the project informally, please contact Markus Brede, AIC research group, Email: , Tel: +44 (0) 2380 59 3703.

This project is run through participation in the EPSRC Centre for Doctoral Training in Next Generation Computational Modelling (http://ngcm.soton.ac.uk). For details of our 4 Year PhD programme, please see http://www.findaphd.com/search/PhDDetails.aspx?CAID=331&LID=2652

For a details of available projects click here http://www.ngcm.soton.ac.uk/projects/index.html

Visit our Postgraduate Research Opportunities Afternoon to find out more about Postgraduate Research study within the Faculty of Engineering and the Environment: http://www.southampton.ac.uk/engineering/news/events/2016/02/03-discover-your-future.page

How good is research at University of Southampton in General Engineering?

FTE Category A staff submitted: 192.23

Research output data provided by the Research Excellence Framework (REF)

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