Epistemological Disjunctivism in Epistemology of Perception

The defining thesis of epistemological disjunctivism in philosophy of perception roughly says that only the cases of veridical perception can provide us with justification for our perceptual beliefs that is strong enough to ground perceptual knowledge. This type of epistemological disjunctivism is very often based on direct (or naïve) realism––the view that whereas veridical perceptions have mind-independent objects among their constituents, subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations have just mind-dependent objects as their constituents. Epistemological disjunctivism has been claimed to be able to avoid the threat of perceptual scepticism (e.g. by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard) and reconcile epistemological internalism with externalism (e.g. by Duncan Prichard). These claims and the very defining thesis of epistemological disjunctivism are controversial. A PhD thesis should analyse this important debate and contribute original research findings to the conversation on this topic.